We talked about a variety of vegan and animal rights topics, including the gender dynamics of the movement, intersectionality, single-issues, and discourse on Facebook.
365vegans is a fascinating project of activist Amanda Hinds who is travelling the world interviewing vegans as she goes. She recently found herself in Ireland and recorded a number of interviews with Irish and Ireland-based campaigners. Luckily, I was one, and the interview is below... We talked about a variety of vegan and animal rights topics, including the gender dynamics of the movement, intersectionality, single-issues, and discourse on Facebook.
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Both sociologist Zygmunt Bauman [1] and philosopher Tom Regan [2] note that the “the universe of moral obligations” is remarkably “non-universal.” While Bauman claims that human beings have demonstrated an apparent “need” to draw categorical divisions and boundaries between groups, Regan asserts that exercises of exclusion have created “less than ideal” moral communities. Both theorists suggest further that a great deal of human effort is expended in “guarding” carefully drawn boundaries. The following outlines, in a general sense, how and, to some extent, why, boundaries are socially constructed. For advocates of animal rights, what follows may serve to inform campaigning strategies in the sense that animal advocacy challenges some of the relevance of moral boundary drawing and yet, through Bauman’s analysis, it may be seen ~ and must be appreciated ~ that boundary drawing has a great deal of utility and advantage for those who draw them. In other words, boundary drawing is an efficacious method of defining notions of “my group,” one of, possibly, several groups that members of society rely on for the everyday knowledge that they need to survive. Bauman asserts that much essential and routine social knowledge is acquired in early childhood, thus a great deal of what is assumed to be required for “successful” social living involves boundary-drawing activities that may encourage a resistance toward any subsequent claims that seek to effectively weaken or destroy boundaries of discrimination that exist even among human groups. All seasoned social movement and political campaigners, along with other advocates of change, will recognise much truth in Bauman’s implication that human beings are never entirely free from their past in which socialised boundary drawing has created meaningful “us” and “them” categories. Boundaries effectively produce “moral distance;” thus boundaries keep “them” ~ “the other” ~ at bay, serving to emphasise distance and difference, and perhaps holding “them” up to ridicule and/or “humorous” debasement. Often jokes and joking relations can construct and reflect the distancing of “others”: jokes can amplify the putative stupidity of “the other,” serving to dehumanise and depersonalise those placed in “them” categories, while the moral status of “us” is simultaneously elevated. A sufficiency of distance (social and moral) can apparently result in untold cruelty and utter disregard for the rights of those successfully classified as “other.” History reveals that, if a boundary of distinction is ostensibly “sturdy” enough, and especially if created and ideologically maintained by authoritative social agents, then one community can end up murdering and raping its way through another. “Us” and “Them.” In Thinking Sociologically, written as an introductory text, Bauman explains in detail the societal prevalence and manufacture of “us” and “them” categories, along with the vital role of the lifelong process of socialisation; the social importance of “belonging;” the significance of notions of “community;” and the construction of “in-groups” and “out-groups.” In sum, Bauman provides a convincing sociological account of social learning and boundary construction which he connects to the concept of the “non-universal universe of moral obligations,” based on the putative human need to draw boundary lines and become involved in guarding those boundaries. As social animals Bauman notes that human beings “live in the company of other people,” in groups in which we understand that we are interdependent. To say that to live is to live with others “is obvious to the point of banality,” Bauman notes in Postmodern Ethics, yet it is just this “we hardly need to think about it” character of living with others which endows it with much of its sociological importance. For living amongst others is to live in “manifold webs of human interdependency.” One important “product” of this interdependency is something sociology has a special relationship with: common sense. Bauman regards common sense knowledge and understandings as powerful social mechanisms which can fundamentally shape attitudes about the world in which humans live. The apparent “power” of common sense emerges from its general immunity to being seriously questioned with obvious implications for social movement activists who seek social and political change. It has an effective capacity for self-confirmation; its knowledge is based on precepts which are, by its own lights, largely self-evident. Common sense understandings are maintained, argues Bauman, through repetition of the “routine,” and the enactment of the “monotonous nature of everyday life.” This enactment of routine has two characteristics: it informs common sense while being informed by common sense. Bauman adds:
In a way, they remain invisible.
Abiding by - rather than challenging - the norms and values of your group is much the easiest and most unproblematic course to adopt: “Change would require much more effort, self-sacrifice, determination and endurance than are normally needed for living placidly and obediently in conformity with the upbringing offered by the group into which one was born”:
If one wants to witness these processes in action with regard to human-nonhuman relations, we need look no further than the case of podcaster and erstwhile Burger King customer, Erik Marcus. His broadcasts are littered with appeals to conform to the existing norms and values of a speciesist society. While Bauman at least implies that existing values can be negated with difficulty, Marcus pessimistically asserts that the vast majority of living north Americans will only stop eating chickens when they themselves die. Marcus thinks that animal advocates need to have something to say to these militant meat eaters – the only possible concession from these people is their adherence to the principles of animal welfarism: apparently even speciesists want to exploit “humanely.” The problem with this assertion is that it is not well supported by empirical evidence, not even in the links Marcus provides in the belief that they support his views. For example, in a web link to a forum about a recent story about Burger King, there were plenty of voices supporting the notion that there indeed are plenty of militant meat eating speciesists ~ and yet, contrary to Marcus’ claims, many of them clearly do not care at all about animal welfare concerns. For example, “RVGRANDMAV” writes, “I really couldn’t care less about how the animals are treated….they are grown for our food…if you don’t like what is done to them … then don’t eat them!” Meanwhile, “Ana” states that, “Frankly, I don’t care. What livestock eats and perhaps how they live too does get to the palate - and I certainly do care for taste!… If the difference is nowhere in the plate, I really don’t care.” “Dax” asserts in the same forum, and without any discernible commitment to animal welfarism, “I really do not care as long as the food taste good, but I understand that the better the animal is care the tender their meat. Humane stand on animal care: I think is an oxymoron. They raise animals to be eaten….base on this principle I do not care how they raise them; just how good they taste. If you choose not to eat meat please stay away from my plate!” “Tony” says, “… As for industrial farming, we need more of it not less. I care much more about hungry people in developing nations than I do about individual chickens which don’t even have a sense of self”. Likewise, “Oahu” pondered: “Hm, I’m really concerned about the way our chickens are cared for? NO”. This correspondent further suggests that people, “Stop applauding them and give BK a smack. What the bigwigs more likely said is ‘Hm, I noticed our profits could be a lot higher if we catered to the growing trend of people who are opposed to animal cruelty. So, let’s make a minor move…’ So, while all of you pat BK on the back, they are patting their fuller pockets.” “Meredith” says, “Certainly most Americans are either not aware of how their meat is raised and slaughtered, or do not care. This suggests ignorance - not an admirable characteristic in a culture considered to be “advanced.”” “Gordon” tells us: “I love a good steak and I don’t care how they kill the cow,” while “BB” states, “I could not care less. What I’d really like to see is an on/off switch for the nanny’s who spend so much time trying to tell everyone else how to live...” I’m not actually sure what any animal advocate can say to such people: they will reject animal rights just as they plainly reject Marcus’ new welfarism. Rather than thinking that anyone should bend to the opinions of such speciesists ~ or even those who will graciously tolerate the odd welfare move ~ we could think ahead and plan for the future. Advocates for change can assert veganism as the moral baseline position for animal rights supporters and they can openly claim that nonhuman animals are rightholders who have their rights violated routinely by human society. Radical ideas take time to be assessed and evaluated by society: it is the job of the new animal rights movement to get the public used to hearing the claim that animals other than humans are also rights bearers. What can be regarded as second-wave animal advocacy had a false start in the 1970s when utilitarian welfarist Singer beat rightists Regan and Francione to the position of movement initiator. It is only the rights advocates who assert that nonhuman animals are rights bearers and their treatment by humans are rights violations; and it is such people who are fittingly wary of peacemeal welfarist reforms. [1] Bauman, Z. (1988) ‘Sociology after the Holocaust’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol 14(4): 469-97; (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. Oxford: Polity; (1990) Thinking Sociologically. Oxford: Blackwell. (1992) Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies. Oxford: Polity; (1993)Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. [2] Regan, T. (2001) Defending Animal Rights. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press. [3] Davies, C. (1988) ‘Stupidity and rationality: Jokes from the iron cage’, in C. Powell G.E.C. Paton (eds.) Humour in Society: Resistance and Control. Aldershot: Arena. Over a number of exchanges with Dr. Koichi Tagami of Rissho University, Tokyo, Japan, I have been exploring how the issue and idea of animal rights is evolving in Japan. Dr. Tagami is an expert on Marx's theory of alienation and is the author of "Practical Environmental Ethics" (2006). I am grateful to Dr. Tagami for giving me permission to reproduce the following exchange. Dear Dr. Tagami, Hello and I hope you are well. As you are aware I am sure, I am interested in the philosophical evolution of the "animal rights movement". I see that in a very short period of time, you have realised and appreciated that one must turn away from Peter Singer's utilitarianism, and turn toward theorists such as Gary Francione and Tom Regan, if one wishes to gain a genuine animal rights understanding of human relations with the nonhuman world. Given this, you have taken a journey that the "animal rights movement" refuses to take. Therefore, I would be interested to hear of your philosophical journey, so to speak, in your exploration of animal ethics. At the present time, in Europe and North America, there is a struggle going on involving animal advocates who are serious about rights and animal advocates who merely use rights rhetorically, in group names for example. I would very much appreciate your comments on this, should you wish to share them. With very best wishes and respect, Dr. Roger Yates. Dear Dr. Roger Yates. First of all, I would like to explain how I have come to accept the theory of animal rights. To begin with, my main research theme is 'the formation of ideas in early Marx’, and since the publication of my first article in 1991 I have been writing on issues surrounding the texts of early Marx, such as Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and the German Ideology. After collecting the results of my research in a book entitled The Theory of Alienation in Early Marx, I obtained a doctorate in 2000. However, this does not mean that I had no interest in, nor knowledge of, animal ethics. For I have been asked to teach ethics in university since 1994, and as a result, I have come to study issues in modern ethics, and become familiar with Peter Singer’s work. As you well know, Animal Liberation describes in detail the horrific conditions which animals suffer in factory farming, and this strongly impressed on me the strength of Singer’s argument. Yet, at the same time, I felt antagonistic towards his demand for vegetarianism. A ‘meal without meat’ seemed to me at that time unimaginably ‘abnormal’. I loved meat and was under the impression that I could not tolerate vegetarian meals. Besides, the fact that there were no vegetarians around me, and the fact that no one recommended it really worked against me. In terms of my profession, there are many ‘academics’ who teach ethics, but there are no vegetarians, nor an ‘ethicist’ who supported animal rights (this is still the case). On the contrary, the common attitude among the ethicists around me was that it was ‘ridiculous’ to put animals in the same category as humans, and that Singer’s argument was ‘extreme’ and did not deserve to be taken seriously. Consequently, although I felt that Singer’s argument was quite persuasive, I pretended to ‘look away’, and decided ‘not to think about it’. Nevertheless, ever since obtaining a doctorate, I have come to research environmental ethics in earnest. While re-reading books relevant to animal rights, I was becoming more convinced than ever of the evil of meat-eating. And Singer’s message that ‘one should become a vegetarian’ had changed from an irritation like ‘something in-between one’s teeth’ to an intolerable discomfort. Yet the reason I still could not decide to be a vegetarian was that I believed that if I became a vegetarian, my muscles would deteriorate. I like training myself and I thought I couldn’t stand losing the results of all the exercise I had done over the years. That I used to worry about such a small thing is quite laughable now I think about it, but I didn’t know any vegetarians and couldn’t get rid of the stereotype of a ‘pale vegetarian’. Around that time, I happened to come across an opportunity of going to India. It was December 2002. This trip to India turned out to be the biggest turning point in my life. It was literally a ‘culture shock’. One of the culture shocks I experienced was their diet. Apart from expensive restraints for tourists, diners for the Indian general public Alwasa served a set meal of dahl (a kind of soup) and vegetable curry, and even for snacks it was the rule not to use meat rather than the exception. In India ‘not eating meat’ is neither ‘abnormal’ nor ‘strange’, but rather a ‘natural’ thing to do. To witness the fact that far more people than Japan’s population are vegetarian made me feel certain that it is impossible to damage one’s health by not eating meat. After I came back to Japan, I had gradually reduced the amount of meat and animal product I consumed. And before long I became almost vegan at home, although I still consumed a tiny amount of dairy product. When I went out for a meal, if there was no way I could avoid it, I ate a small amount of animal product. Even in such cases, I chose sea food over meat. This is how my present eating habit became established. Eating a small amount of animal product when I go out is a compromise I have to adopt in order to survive in Japan, which is an extremely backward country when it comes to vegetarianism. Of course I don’t want to consume animal product at all, but otherwise I wouldn’t be able to go out at all. Japan really is a difficult place for the vegetarian to live in. Once I became a vegetarian, I discovered that my worry that ‘I would lose muscles’ was totally unfounded. On the contrary, my muscles came to develop more easily through training. Being able to lead a much healthier life when I am vegetarian than when I was a meat-eater has allowed me to feel that it is right to be a vegetarian. And as I lived a vegetarian life, before I knew it, the desire for meat had disappeared. By becoming a vegetarian, I felt as though the thorn with which Singer had pricked my heart had been pulled out, and this gave me a stirring feeling that I was finally released from hypocrisy. I no longer have to adopt an attitude that is unworthy of an ethicist – that is to say, an attitude of pretence that animals are excluded as the objects of moral consideration. However, once I became a vegetarian and seriously committed to animal issues as my own problems rather than somebody else’s, I started to look at Singer’s argument differently from the way I used to. Although I used to think that Singer’s argument was a radical extremist one which forced people to become vegetarian, I began to think that in fact his argument is full of holes; a ‘loose’ argument. For although Singer emphasises that we should not inflict suffering on animals, he does not criticise the use of animals by humans in itself. Therefore, if animals are kept in comfortable environments and slaughtered painlessly, he will have no right to criticise factory farming. And as for animal experiment, if the ‘benefit’ humans gain outweighs the loss inflicted on animals, then, in Singer’s argument, animal experimentation is acceptable as an ‘exception’. Soon after I became a vegetarian and started to engage with animal issues seriously, I discovered that Singer’s argument cannot be a true rationale for the protection of animals. For, because Singer’s theory is not a ‘rights theory’ that regards animals as ‘rights-bearers’, I cannot help but think that his theory is one that accumulates ‘deferral’ which allows the use of animals, and ends up rolling down the ‘slippery slope’, and that such a theory would make the animal rights movement spineless. Thus, although Singer made me aware that we should protect animals by becoming vegetarians, once I actually became one, I began to think that in order truly to protect animals, we should not stop at Singer’s position, but proceed to genuine animal rights theories such as Tom Regan’s or Gary Francione’s. This is how I have become an animal rightist. Compared to the study on Marx, I have but begun to research animal rights. As a beginning I have submitted an essay [now published] entitled the Reality of Animal Rights Theories to a human rights organisation journal. The aim is to cause a stir in the present situation where Peter Singer is mistaken to be a representative of animal rights theories. Although you may find it unbelievable, in Japan there are few ethicists who subsequently declare themselves to be vegetarians and then support vegetarianism or animal rights theories. There is a gap between theory and practice. Against this tendency, I intend to deepen my research as a vegetarian animal rightist and to present my own position. Yours truly, Dr. Koichi Tagami. We can only hope that, as Dr. Tagami continues his journey toward veganism, that it becomes as easy as it is elsewhere. It is a noteworthy and welcome development that there is someone in Japan able to explain what is - and what is not - animal rights. A substantial part of the ideological exploitation, control, management, or "stewardship" of the natural world finds its expression in the strict separation of human and animal categories. Dess and Chapman[1] comment that remnants of feelings of "commonality between humans and nonhumans generally has been supplanted by notions of human superiority," while historian Keith Thomas argues that agriculture stands to land as does cooking to raw meat, meaning that "wild" and "raw" nature is made "suitable" for human consumption.[2] Thus, in order to carry out "God’s" orders, humans are instructed to level the woods, till the soil, drive off the predators, kill the "vermin," plough up the bracken and drain the fens. Humans must institute a process of "ordering" and "taming" of plants, animals and natural forces. A transformation ranging from pre-modern game-keeping to modern weed-killing gardening practices which found its most destructive manifestation in recent European history in the devastating contrast between the deliberately constructed notions of ‘pleasant harmony’ as opposed to "revolting cacophony."[3] Jim Mason notes the significance of the Biblical stories of Adam and Eve, the Fall, the Flood and the "gift" of dominionism; that Genesis tells the creation story - "the fundamental myth of Western civilisation" - from which human beings "learn our first and most basic understandings about who we are and how we came to be in the world."[4] However, Mason claims it is an error to locate Genesis as the source of dominionist views which situate humans way above and beyond lowly and savage nature and her animals. These views of human superiority are a product of what Mason calls "agri-culture’" which, as a concept of domination, seems to bear a resemblance to how early members of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research conceptualised, at least in part, the notion of instrumental rationality.[5] Hebrew Scribes - those who physically wrote the Genesis account - were recounting already existing tales and myths that had been orally transmitted from generation to generation before the advent of writing. Consequently:
Mason also emphasises secular influences on the construction of attitudes about humans and other animals. He notes that poets and philosophers from Egypt, Persia, Greece, Rome, and other "settled, wealthy, agricultural civilisations," generally adopted a world view which regarded nature and all of the living world as existing exclusively for humans, who should rule and control the natural world. Mason claims that, just like Biblical tales, classical writings hold "great authority in Western culture and they are still seen as sources of, and bases for, the rules governing how people should live." He therefore argues that, like Genesis, classical writers authored and authorised already existing, firmly established, agri-cultural views. Of course, there have been dissenting voices raised against dominant paradigms in all ages, but Mason maintains that dominionist agri-culturalist thought has become the established human mind-set, at least in the nations of the Western world. The agri-cultural mind-set - based on controlling, ordering and managing the natural world – is now "second nature" to human beings. The Role of Philosophy. Classical Greek thought was never utterly monolithic and can be divided into rival schools such as those based on Platonic and Pythagorean teachings. However, Platonic thought, especially as expressed by Aristotle, became favoured in the West, providing ‘fuel’ for Christian and Renaissance views that persisted in seeing "Man" at the top of a "natural hierarchy" within a moral theory called perfectionism.[7] This hierarchy is conveniently ordered by "God" in Christian thought but, for Aristotle, it was simply a product of the laws of nature. A similar division of thought emerged in Rome, according to Mason, with largely the same outcome. Thus, as much as some animal advocates make a habit of recounting the views of Ovid, Seneca, Porphyry, and Plutarch,[8] it was agrarian Roman culture which "took human dominionism over nature for granted" with notions that humans were "absolute masters" of the earth, meaning that its products could be seen as "ours." The notion that humankind controlled the natural world is found in Cicero’s comment that, "We sow the seeds and plant the trees. We fertilise the earth. We stop, direct, and turn the rivers."[9] Moving towards what he labels "modern Western dominionism," Mason argues that the same "humans-on-top" messages are found in the works of Thomas Aquinas,[10] Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes. Mason claims that Aquinas "welded" sacred and secular ideas together to produce a "hard" version of dominionism expressed in Catholicism ever since. Dominionism translated into modern or "Enlightenment" thought as science was characterised as a useful tool of human "freedom," not so much to gain simply an understanding of the world, but to gain a firm control of it. Mason says that the so-called "fathers of modern science," Bacon and Descartes, whose lives overlapped around 1600, effectively provided an updated version of dominionism for the modern industrial age.[11] Citing William Leiss’ 1972 book, The Domination of Nature, Mason asserts that Bacon linked the dominionism that was thousands of years old with the modern promise of increased human health - and wealth - through scientific developments. In "passionate pleas" to use knowledge for the betterment of "man’s earthly estate,"[12] Bacon suggested that producing "new inventions" and "human riches" was the main role for science. Bacon declared that "Man" was "at the centre of the world" and argued that, if it were not for human control of the natural world, all would go "astray." There would be no "purpose." No "aim." Bacon spoke of the natural world as "her" and thought "she" could be made a "slave" (Bacon’s Novum Organum) as some Marxians would later view nature as some sort of "servant" of human interests. Religious views allow humans to dominate nature, whereas Bacon made the whole idea seem desirable[13] in a modern formula that involved subduing nature "by submission."[14] At roughly the time of Bacon’s death, Descartes was credited with advancing a position that seems to completely separate humans from nature and all other animals. Descartes is said to have frequently articulated the ‘absolute gulf’ thesis which still resonates today in a more restricted sense, tempered, that is, by the principles of orthodox animal welfarism. The French philosopher-priest-animal experimenter apparently "detached" humanity from all else and characterised humanity as the ultimate ruling class. In Descartes’ view, human beings could be "aloof" from nature. Nature amounted to "underlings" when compared to "Man." Humans are so superior that it is folly not to conceive of humanity far removed from the natural world. Essentially, Descartes "cut humanity loose" from nature in an act of ideological reclassification. Thus, other living beings were simply to be seen as "insensible" and "soulless machines," similar to clocks or automated dolls and toys.[15] Descartes came up with an apparently neat solution to explain his general position in the light of the vivisection he performed. Cutting nonhuman beings open and finding similar organs, bones, nerves, muscles, and blood vessels to those discovered in human bodies, he reasoned that a major, and important, difference between human beings and other animals must be the former’s ability to think. Given found physical similarities, animals-other-than-human were not, after all, to be regarded as absolutely soulless in Cartesian thought. Thus, Descartes seemingly began to argue that both humans and other animals had a "corporeal soul" which is purely mechanical and depends to some extent on "animal spirits" in the human or nonhuman body. However, he stated that thought resides in the "incorporeal mind," another – second - "soul," a "thinking substance," which apparently only human animals have. Descartes also appears to have explained the fact that some animals can move faster than humans by saying that the "machine of the body" in nonhumans move "more violently" than the human body which is moved by "will." Since "Man" can create various forms of automata, he argued, it is only reasonable to suppose that nature would also produce its own automata. For Descartes, these "natural automata" are the nonhuman animals of the world.[16] Richard Ryder[17] argues that Descartes was "desperate" to conceive of a huge difference between humans and the other animals, despite the contrary evidence produced by his own knife and scalpel. Perhaps such a search for separation is important in enabling animal experimenters to perform vivisection on nonhuman animals with a morally clear conscience? If this was the aim, it apparently worked, and scientific anti-vivisectionists and animal advocates recount in gruesome detail how Cartesian-inspired vivisectors would carry out the most violent experiments, often repeatedly on the same victim, and with no pain relief.[18] Furthermore, highlighting the social importance of humour and joking relations, they would laugh at anyone who showed concern for experimental "models." Descartes is even reputed to have performed experiments on a dog owned by his wife, much to her disgust.[19] Whatever the purpose of Descartes’ search for difference, Mason states that he presented humankind with a renewed licence to kill along with a renewed licence to exploit nature and nonhuman animals more ruthlessly than ever. He successfully "de-coupled" and "desensitised" attitudes to nature exploitation and "blew away" any existing timidity that remained about "nature conquest." These Cartesian formulations are a great assistance to all animal users: for how could it be ethically wrong or immoral to kill animals if they were just unfeeling machines? Conceiving of the belief system Bauman names societal "gardening," experimenting nature controllers and nature conquerors were now able to also declare themselves "noble improvers" of humanity.[20] By advancing the disciplines of science and reason both Bacon and Descartes fuelled the expansionist aspirations of Europeans who ‘discovered’ North America, the Pacific and much of the rest of the globe from the sixteenth century onwards. William Leiss (cited by Mason) – as well as Thomas[21] - explore strands of seventeenth and eighteenth century attitudes toward nature and animals and identify fairly widespread beliefs, such as the idea that nature possesses ‘secrets’ that need to be discovered; that "Man" "perfects" the work of creation; and that the natural world needs human "superintendence." Without such human control, things will go wrong and will not "function" properly. The result of such attitudes is the development of a creed of "aggressive, probing, scientific dominionism" in which nature domination and species differentiation were fundamental intellectual bandwagons and dominant paradigms of the modern age.[22] By the nineteenth century, Saint-Simon optimistically declared an age in which humans need no longer exploit other humans: Humanity's activity would be confined to exploiting the natural world, or "external nature," as he described it. Karl Marx famously foresaw a future world in which human beings would co-operatively control nature, "instead of allowing it to rule them;" while Friedrich Engels suggested that socialism would bring into being a situation where humans could become the "true masters" of nature. For Marx and Engels there is no suggestion that animals other than human animals would benefit in their radical vision of a brand new abundant socialist world. No notion that nonhuman animals might be regarded as members of the exploited proletariat, despite the huge amount of forced labour they provide. Rather, Marx and Engels declared, "It will be possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind to, without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic."[23] Mason notes that more recent Marxian views, such as Maurice Cornforth’s [1950’s], "expressed a dominionist, human supremacist outlook at least as absolute as that of Genesis, Aquinas, Bacon and the rest."[24] For example, Cornforth entitled a section of his work, "Man’s Mastery of Nature," asserting, "Increasing mastery of nature is, indeed, the essential content of material progress. In mastering natural forces men learn their laws of operation and so make use of those laws for human purposes." By "mastering" natural forces humans transform them from "enemies" to "servants." In the communist future, Cornforth said:
Even those radicals who ‘would turn the world upside down’ never looked critically at the exploitation that exists in human-nonhuman relations. On the contrary, they would "keep humanity at the top," controlling nature "with an iron hand."[25] Speciesist sentiments do not recognise political categories of left and right it seems. For example, 1960’s philosopher Eric Hoffer dreamed of the day when "technological man" could wipe out jungles, make arable land from deserts and swamps, make mountains productive with terracing, control the flow and direction of rivers, kill all "pests," and even control the weather in order that the entire globe could be made "useful" to humanity. Meanwhile B.F. Skinner, in his 1962 book, Walden Two, explained his utopian vision in terms of the "triumph over nature," the "conquest of nature," and the "scientific conquest of the world." Such views are extremely dominionist and speciesist since they see nature as "just a pile of untapped resources." Similar views come from a small group of neo-Cartesians, such as Buckminster Fuller, who regard nature as "negligible," "obsolete;" a "messy," "disorderly," "unpredictable" thing - quite "female" - to be "avoided," "controlled," and "contained."[26] Nature dominators often focus their exploitative attention on animals because they have been viewed as the most visible, alive and vital part of nature. A contemporary professor of business law and ethics from a newspaper editorial who provides, Mason argues, "a ‘freeze-dried’ argument packaged long ago by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes:"
[1] Nancy K. Dess & Clinton D. Chapman, ‘“Humans and Animals?” On Saying What We Mean’, Psychological Science, Vol 9(2) (1998): 156-7. [2] Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800. (London: Allen Lane, 1983). [3] Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust. (Oxford: Polity, 1989). [4] Jim Mason, An Unnatural Order: The Roots of Our Destruction of Nature. (New York: Lantern, 2005): 25. [5] See Ian Craib, Modern Social Theory: From Parsons to Habermas. (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984), 186-190. Various members of the Frankfurt School, such as Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, became engaged in speculation about the earliest origins - and the ‘flowering’ - of instrumental reason in the way that Mason and others have thought about the origins of the instrumental use, ‘management’ and categorisation of other animals. [6] Mason, Unnatural, 32-33. [7] See also Tom Regan, Defending Animal Rights. (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001): 5-6. [8] See Jon Wynne-Tyson, ed., The Extended Circle: A Dictionary of Humane Thought. (Fontwell, Sussex: Centaur Press, 1985); The Extended Circle: An Anthology of Humane Thought. (London: Cardinal, 1990); Andrea G. Wieber & David O. Wieber, eds., Souls Like Ourselves: Inspired Thoughts for Personal and Planetary Advancement. (Rochester, MN: Sojourne Press, 2000). [9] Mason, Unnatural, 34. [10] See Stephen R.L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) for a critique of Thomist views. [11] Mason, Unnatural, 35. [12] R. S. Peters, ‘Francis Bacon (1561-1626)’, in J.O. Urmson & J. Rëe, eds., The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers. (London: Routledge, 1991). [13] Mason, Unnatural, 37, emphasis in original. [14] Zygmunt Bauman & Tim May, Thinking Sociologically, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001): 174. [15] See Mason, Unnatural, 37-38. Tom Regan & Peter Singer, eds., Animal Rights and Human Obligation. (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), features selections from Descartes’ Discourse on Method, and a reproduction of two letters written by Descartes discussing main points from his ‘animals are machines’ thesis; and a reply by Voltaire. [16] See Descartes in Regan & Singer, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 65-66. [17] Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism. (Oxford: Berg, 2000): 221. [18] Hans Ruesch, Slaughter of the Innocent. (London: Futura, 1979); Naked Empress. (London: CIVITAS, 1982); Richard D. Ryder, Victims of Science. (London: National Anti-Vivisection Society, 1983). [19] Ryder, Animal Revolution, 53. [20] Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). [21] Thomas, Man and the Natural World. [22] Mason, Unnatural, 39. [23] Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. 10 Vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976): 5, 47. [24] Mason, Unnatural, 40. [25] Ibid.: 40-41. [26] Ibid.: 41. [27] Quoted in ibid.: 42. Francione, Regan & Singer. Philosopher Tom Regan [1] recognises that, in thoughts about the human use of other animals, social attitudes are influenced not only by dominant forms of thinking, but also by "established cultural practices." Indeed, he states that the rights view on human relations with other sentient beings involves "issuing condemnations" of such practices. However, Regan maintains that animal rights, properly conceived, is, contrary to pro-use claims, "not anti-business, not anti-freedom of the individual, not anti-science, not anti-human." For Regan, the rights view is "pro-justice," seeking as it does to alter the "scope of justice" to include many animals other than human. Regan further recognises that the case for animal rights will be heavily contested, not least because "prejudices die hard." In addition to the issue of prejudice, Regan is keen to underline the influence of the "insulating" function of "widespread secular customs" and religious belief, likewise acknowledging the "sustaining authority" of "large and powerful economic interests." Finally, in this diverse matrix of social constructionism, he appreciates the protection afforded to the whole system by the common law. Ultimately a political battleground is sketched out in which any philosophy of animal rights is bound to be substantially criticised and contested. Criticised and contested by philosophers who just do not agree that "the case" has been adequately made – but also by many who have personal or vested interests in the continuation of the human exploitation of other animals. It is tempting, furthermore, to suspect that many objections to animal rights, whether from trained philosophers such as Frey [2] and Cohen,[3] or journalists, or various other commentators, arise in the first instance at least from efforts to find the justification for a bacon and egg breakfast already eaten, and the steak dinner planned for later on. Regan insists that moral philosophy can and will play a role in political action associated with the notion of animal rights because "history shows that ideas do make a difference." Indeed, he wrote The Case for Animal Rights in order that the animal protection movement would benefit by being well versed about the foundations on which much of their claims-making rests. The hoped-for result being substantial cultural change that Regan regards as a prerequisite for a widespread adoption of genuine animal rights thinking over animal welfarism. Regan also articulates his firm belief that "moral philosophy is no substitute for political action," but insists, "still, it can make a contribution. Its currency is ideas." This assertion was made many years ago in 1983. However, it appears that large sections of the animal advocacy movement was not (and is not) listening to this important message. Many factions in the modern animal protection movement do not agree that a well worked out philosophical position assists in the furtherance of altering the moral standing of other animals. Moreover, many of those that do seem to agree with the general point that social movements require a solid basis for claims-making, appear not to accept the case for animal rights in the first place. Recent developments in the animal movement tends to confirm such a view. For example, Francione [4] states that "the modern animal 'rights' movement has explicitly rejected the doctrine of animal rights." In fact, it might be tempting to claim, analogous to Gilroy’s [5] declaration that "there ain’t no black in the Union Jack," that there ain’t much rights in "animal rights" either. This tends to beg the question, if not rights violations, what do modern animal advocates substantially rely upon in order to make claims on behalf of nonhuman animals? Francione argues that the contemporary animal movement appears content to rely on a new formulation of traditional ideas, which he labels "new welfarism." He describes this conception of new welfarism as a "hybrid position" which may be understood to be a more progressive, or in Francione’s terms, a "modified" welfare position compared with traditional animal welfarism, especially in the sense that this "version of animal welfare…accepts animal rights as an ideal state of affairs that can be achieved only through continued adherence to animal welfare measures." This appears to be a crucial defining issue of so-called new welfarism: that its adherents are content talking about the eventual ending of animal exploitation, rather than expecting that the best the animal movement can or should do is tightly regulate nonhuman exploitation to such an extent that "cruelty" and "unnecessary suffering" is greatly reduced or, ideally, eliminated altogether. However, for Francione, new welfarists – despite what sets them apart from traditionalists of the genre - should be regarded as committed to the endorsement of measures "indistinguishable" from policies put forward by those "who accept the legitimacy of animal exploitation." Unsurprisingly, such statements have angered many animal advocates. Francione puts forward two reasons to help explain apparent disparity between theory and practice:
When animal advocates discuss Francione’s position on email lists and forums, many object bitterly to the assumption that supporting a number, many, or all animal welfare measures does indeed "accept the legitimacy of animal exploitation" – they claim the opposite, that accepting welfare improvements does not diminish their commitment to abolitionism. Contributors have difficulty accepting Francione’s claim that new welfarism necessarily accepts, on some level, the legitimacy of the animal exploitation issue in question. On the contrary, many argue that any "welcoming" of a welfare measure, or even sets of them, and over an extended period of time, can be done within an acknowledgement that their position is ultimately abolitionist in intent. Debate such as this amounts to beliefs about whether forms of animal welfarism are able to provide "stepping stones" toward the ending of the human exploitation of other animals or not.[6] Francione appears to have assumed that campaigners will be concerned about his claim that welfarist strategies have failed – and will continue to fail – to advance the cause of animal rights, and that a perspective based on genuine rights formulation can likely bring greater advances for nonhuman animals. He acknowledges that "rights talk" is a rhetorical matter in the movement which has lead to non-rightist Peter Singer being regarded as the foremost "animal rights philosopher" ever since the mid-1970s publication of Animal Liberation. For Francione, therefore, the contemporary animal movement continues to commit cardinal philosophical and tactical errors:
Future historians of the animal protection movement may well take an interest in such questions. Anecdotal evidence and contributions to email listings suggest that Francione’s view expressed in the quote above may well be vindicated: many activists continue to suggest that the welfare + welfare + welfare = rights equation bears fruit for the animal movement. One must hope that Francione was not mistaken in believing animal activists would take the time to explore the problem he raises. In effect, some sort of impasse exists. On the one hand, Francione suggests that the animal movement makes ethical and tactical errors by not sorting out its philosophical position that directs its action. That, because it does not provide what is required, animal welfarism ought to be rejected by all seeking to radically alter human-nonhuman relations. On the other hand, however, many activists and the careerists in established organisations care less about philosophical purity as long as something is being done on behalf of nonhuman animals and membership numbers are maintained. Advocates who wish to pursue a position based on rights thinking are very few in number and, furthermore, do not often feature in "leadership" positions within the current animal protection movement. Francione has had the frustrating experience of seeing his ideas - and indeed those of Regan - largely marginalised within the animal movement over the years. Attempts to bring bona fide rights thinking into the heart of a social movement bearing the name has been largely rejected. Francione’s work, especially because it includes a strong critique of new welfarism, has not so much been regarded as a source of philosophical clarity within a social movement, nor helpful in terms of strategic thinking, but rather labelled "disruptive," "divisive," and "elitist." In retrospect, it may well have been somewhat unwise to call activists who see themselves as "radical," "full-on," "cutting-edge" campaigners "new welfarists" and expect them to welcome or even tolerate the criticism. Nevertheless, the evidence points to the fact that the modern animal movement remains content with the philosophical leadership provided by Singer (to the extent that philosophy is thought important in the first place). It financially supports an organisational leaderships that includes many who may be welfarist in orientation, even in the traditional sense of the word, or else essentially use the term animal rights as a rhetorical devise only. Some opponents of rights-based formulations are careful to consistently use terms such as "animal liberation," more often, and thus ironically, than has Peter Singer. Francione complains that Singer’s consequentialist utilitarian approach, based on reducing animal suffering and balancing interests,[7] has marginalised the abolitionist approach to animal rights. When McDonald’s announced in 2002 an animal welfare initiative to increase battery cage space and phase out "beak trimming" practices by its suppliers, the move was greeted by many animal protectionists, including Singer himself, as the most important "advance" for nonhuman animals since the publication of Animal Liberation in the 1970s. For understandable psychological reasons, "victories" on any scale tend to be loudly trumpeted within social movements. While this could be characterised as a movement getting what little it can when it can, supporters state that they are being "practical," displaying a poverty of ambition apparently predicated on them "knowing for sure" that the public will and will always reject the notion of animal rights. In any event, they suggest, how can animal advocacy mobilisations be seen to reject measures that seem to ease the plight of so many suffering nonhumans? For such advocates the McDonald’s case and others may be seen as further indication, since larger cage space and specific alterations in production procedures were the only proposals "on offer," that campaigning on an "extreme" or a "fundamentalist" rightist platform, and seeking the rapid abolition of major aspects of commercial animal exploitation, is totally unrealistic – utopian indeed. Such a position begs questions. Why, since the modern animal protection movement has rarely if ever pursued an abolitionist agenda for any prolonged period, are many advocates apparently and unequivocally so sure that it is doomed to failure? Why are they so convinced that it will take hundreds of years? Why, moreover, that a philosophical grounding in widely accepted ideas of rights undoubtedly represent demands that unrealistically call for "too much?" What follows outlines Francione’s and Regan’s rights-based approaches to human-nonhuman relations: approaches that are often regarded as "utopian" and "extreme" both within and without the "animal rights" movement. These are approaches not adopted or widely followed within the present animal movement. Francione agrees with Regan that philosophy and political action go together. Indeed, in contrast to many in the movement, he claims the latter requiresthe former to inform its direction: A social movement must have a theory if it is to have action at all… I suggest that we need a new theory to replace the one that we have. I am not unrealistic. I recognise that even if we adopt an abolitionist theory, abolition will not occur immediately. Change will necessarily be incremental. But it is my view that the explicit goal must be abolition and that abolition must shape incremental change. Regan and Francione are generally acknowledged as the major theoreticians of perspectives that seek to build on established rights formulations, and apply - or extend - to them to nonhuman animals. Regan is a Kantian deontologist who argues that many nonhumans are "subjects-of-a-life," a factor demanding that humans respect their inherent rights. Francione is a law professor particularly critical of the property status of other animals. His rights-based formulation is thought less complicated than Regan’s; he claims basic rights for all sentient beings. Reganite and Francionian positions on human relations with other sentient beings can be regarded as attempts to bring genuine rights views to bear on the issue of the human treatment of other animals. Such approaches are different in nature to traditional or classical welfarist stances; and different also from Peter Singer’s version of utilitarianism which is the principal philosophical grounding of modern day new welfarism. Neither Regan nor Francione use rights concepts, or the language of rights, in a rhetorical manner as many other animal activists do, and both believe that protective rights formulations can be plausibly extended to prevent current large-scale institutionalised human exploitation of certain species of nonhuman animals. As stated, Regan’s and Francione’s works have been effectively marginalised, so the following acknowledges and highlights a paradoxical situation in which the so-called "animal rights movement" virtually rejects genuine rights theories while embracing a non-rights animal liberation position as its main philosophical stance. As implied above, however, it should be recognised that even the phrase "philosophical stance" can be quite misleading in relation to much current animal advocacy in which "philosophising" per se is actively frowned upon, and/or seen as a very poor second to "doing things" (doing anything) "for animals." [1] Regan, T. (1983) The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. [2] Frey, R.G. (1980) Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals. Oxford: Oxford University Press; (1983) Rights, Killing, and Suffering. Oxford: Blackwell. [3] Cohen, C. (1986) ‘The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research’, New England Journal of Medicine,315(14) (Oct 2): 865-70. [4] Francione, G. L. (1996) Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. [5] Gilroy, P. (1987) There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. London: Hutchinson. [6] Among other arguments, Francione responds to such points by saying that, "as a practical matter, [animal welfarism] does not work. We have had animal welfare laws in most western countries for well over a hundred years now, and they have done little to reduce animal suffering and they have certainly not resulted in the gradual abolition of any practices… As to why welfarism fails…the reason has to do with the property status of animals. If animals are property, then they have no value beyond that which is accorded to them by their owners. Reform does not work because it seeks to force owners to value their property differently and to incur costs in order to respect animal interests." www.vegdot.org/special/Gary%20Francione [7] Benton and Redfearn write: "Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation is…within the utilitarian tradition, and it may be that the animal welfare movement’s concern with animal suffering is a measure of the pervasiveness of utilitarianism as the ‘common sense’ of secular morality." Benton, T. & Redfearn, S. (1996) ‘The Politics of Animal Rights - Where is the Left?’ New Left Review, Jan/Feb: 43-58 Regan and Francione. Benton and Redfearn [1] state that, as a matter of historical record, "the ethics of the 'rights' tradition has been markedly anthropocentric. To 'qualify' as an inherently valuable being one had to possess 'reason,' 'autonomy,' 'moral agency' or some other capacity generally restricted to humans." Tom Regan, they go on, gets morality over the species barrier by concentrating on the criteria of right holding, a familiar notion in rights discourse addressing the question of the expansion of rights bearing. Clearly, many human beings do not have the characteristics listed above, neither do many have language use, another favoured way of deciding who holds rights. There is therefore a philosophical puzzle to be solved here. Either human beings without the above capacities are themselves not right holders or, if they remain so, on what basis are nonhumans, with similar capacities, to be denied at least basic or negative rights? In general rights discourse, the notion that rights have been converted from shields to swords is seriously contested by various theorists: however, in the formulation in view, the idea of animal rights is clearly about rights as protective shields for individuals. Regan’s "subjects-of-a-life" are not necessarily moral agents; and logically other animals are placed into the category of right holding moral patients along with certain "marginal" humans (as they have became known in rights discourse). Using a post-Darwinian understanding of the psychological complexity of many nonhuman animals, Benton and Redfearn claim that Regan shows that, "though animals are not moral agents in the full sense, they have enough sense of self as persisting through time, ability to express preferences and so on to be said to have 'interests,' which may be harmed or favoured by human agents." Benton and Redfearn investigate the "lesser-than" aspect of "moral marginals" and conclude that not only are they not denied protective rights, "on the contrary, it might well be argued that it is just because of their lack of these attributes that they are in special need of the protection offered by the attribution of rights." For these commentators, Regan’s concentration on the rights of the individual strengthens the rights approach over what they describe as the more moderate "linkage of utilitarianism and animal welfare reform." The one advantage of utilitarianism, they claim, is its reliance on "mere sentience" as the ethically relevant criteria. The strength of that, they say, is due to the fact that hardly anyone in the modern world would dispute that many other animals are sentient beings. A further "strategic limitation" of Regan’s position, Benton and Redfearn argue, stems from the huge social and personal changes implied by respect for the rights of many nonhuman animals.[2] This would require "both social transformation and lifestyle changes of very fundamental kinds." How many, they ask, will be prepared to adopt a vegan diet and avoid all animal products? Surely, only those who could adhere to vegan philosophy can remain consistent with the logic of animal rights? Some animal advocates suggest that a strict advocacy of just the vegan diet can be "divisive" "purist," and "elitist," whereas theorists such as Francione simply see it as a logical consequence of accepting the rights view about human relations with other sentient beings.[3] Francione’s position is free of the first "limitation" in Regan – but clearly not of the second. In other words, Francione’s basic right theory argues that a being’s sentience alone is enough to demand that humans recognise and respect their rights. Francione, as said, firmly declares that respect for other animals' rights does indeed require the personal adoption of veganism. Francione begins his outline of animal rights with a familiar warning common in accounts of rights discourse: "There is a great deal of confusion surrounding the concept of rights."[4] His focus is on one aspect of rights, the protection they may offer, and argues that this is common feature of virtually every theory about rights: in other words, "a right is a particular way of protecting interests":
A feature of rights formulation associated with other animals often clash with the views of environmental ethicists such as "deep ecologists."[5] Dispute may arise due to the concentration in rights thinking on protecting individuals rather than emphasising, say, "species conservation." However, citing Rollin’s "The Legal and Moral Bases of Animal Rights," Francione notes that rights were deliberately constructed as ethical ideas about respecting individuals. Rights protect individuals even in cases in which the general welfare of society would be improved by the right being ignored or not respected. Francione provides a detailed account of the concept of rights and rights theory in the context of animal law in Animals, Property, and the Law [6] in which he distinguishes respect-based rights from policy-based rights. He argues for a basic right for sentient nonhuman animals: the right not to be treated as "things." For Francione, this basic right is not only a respect-based right but it is a special respect-based right, "in that it is necessary in order to have any rights or moral significance at all, irrespective of the political system and whatever other respect-based rights are protected. The basic right not to be treated as a thing recognises that the right holder is a person."[4] Moving toward his conception of animal rights, while accepting that no rights are absolute, "in the sense that their protection has no exception," Francione builds on the notion that all humans "who are not brain dead or otherwise nonsentient" (and presumably who are not masochistic) have an interest in avoiding suffering and pain. This interest is tied to the importance of being a legal person:
Resisting a critical critique of this statement, if only by regarding it as an ideal type formulation, Francione’s point is fairly straightforward. In fact, he does himself acknowledge that human slavery still persists in the modern world, even though "the institution is universally regarded as morally odious and is legally prohibited." Returning to his theme about basic rights, Francione argues that all and any "further" rights are dependent on basic ones, in particular "they must have the basic right not to be treated as a thing." By examining the principle of "equal consideration" which says that similar interests should be treated in a similar way, Francione makes the case for animal rights, at least the case for the basic right that concerns him the most:
As a matter of logic, then, Francione claims that "if we mean what we say" about other animals being morally significant, as even traditional animal welfare does, "then we really have no choice:" if social attitudes to human slavery desire its abolition rather than its regulation, "we are similarly committed to the abolition of animal exploitation, and not merely to its regulation." In his version of animal rights, Francione focuses on notions of basic or "innate" rights, distinctions about ideas of "natural rights," and the thoughts of, among others, Kant, Locke, and modern political theorist Henry Shue, and so builds on the widely accepted "value" of basic human rights. He argues that, "there is certainly a great deal of disagreement about precisely what rights human beings have," however it is clear that all humans are seen as right holders which prevents them being "treated exclusively as a means to the end of another." In pointing out that this basic right is different from "all other rights," Francione claims it as a pre-legal right; and a necessary pre-requisite for other important rights. What is the use, Francione asks, of thinking about rights appropriate to human beings, such as the right to free speech, voting rights, etc., if their basic right not to be a thing is not respected? Gary Francione’s formulation of basic rights is extremely attractive. Human animals would do well if they were to recognise and acknowledge that their basic rights were in fact their animal rights. [1] Benton, T. and Redfearn, S. (1996) "The Politics of Animal Rights - Where is the Left?" New Left Review, Jan/Feb: 43-58. [2] Benton and Redfearn note that Regan’s rights approach will find opposition in some perspectives based on "ecological morality." For example, the rights view implies that only animals that resemble humans in relevant ways "qualify" as right bearers. Regan’s theory, they note, "offers nothing at all to animals not conforming to the ‘subject of a life’ criterion." [3] Francione, G. L. (1996) Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. [4] Francione, G.L. (2000) Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press. [5] Regan, T. (2001) Defending Animal Rights. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press; David Orton. Discussion paper about Deep Ecology and Animal Rights, http://home.ca.inter.net/~greenweb/DE-AR.html [6] Francione, G.L. (1995) Animals, Property, and the Law. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Rights as Social Constructs. The modern animal advocacy movement, as well as its countermovement mobilisations, frequently (and correctly) presents the book Animal Liberation as the origins of second wave animal advocacy (assuming acceptance that the efforts of Henry Salt’s Humanitarian League amounts to the "first wave"), along with an implicit and often explicit (and incorrect) claim that the book, and therefore the movement, is based on Peter Singer’s (nonexistent) "animal rights perspective." The frequent characterisation of his utilitarian perspective as an animal rights position, and presumably the number of times Animal Liberation has been described as "the animal rights bible,"[1] has seemingly led its author to regret ever having used rights language, even rhetorically and, according to Regan,[2] Singer remains committed to his claim that attributing rights to other animals is not possible. Some of the misrepresentation of Singer’s work as rights-based theorising, especially by pro-use countermovements, appears on the face of it to be deliberately ideological in intent. However, in relation to what Singer says about his own position, Gary Francione fully accepts that Singer is entirely consistent to the extent that he rejects the notion of moral right holding in the case of human and nonhuman animals. Moreover, his consistent utilitarian principles have led Singer to accept that "there might be circumstances" in which human and animal exploitation…could be justified in light of consequences.[3] Francione suggests, however, that rights concepts are always likely to be important and invoked as resources in human affairs and, therefore, utilitarian "balancing" of human and nonhuman interests are extremely dangerous in terms of nonhuman interests. Dangerous precisely because protective rights considerations are not conceptually available "to limit the results of the balancing process." Francione clarifies the point by putting it in a different way, while at the same time revealing how authentic animal rights theorists attempt to build on already established ways of thinking about the protection afforded by bearing rights:
The questions, "where do rights come from?" and "how are 'rights' used in animal rights thinking?" are, of course, pertinent. Perhaps the first thing to be said about matters concerning any formulation of rights, following Steve Kangas,[4] is that "the origin of rights is a messy and complex debate." Kangas suggests that the understanding of the first question of where rights "come from" can be aided by separating out three types of thinking about rights: conservative, liberal, and libertarian, and also by thinking about four initial bases put forward for the creation of rights: that rights are "natural" (following Locke), "inalienable," "God-given," and "self-evident." Kangas states that until a few hundred years ago, most philosophers believed that rights could be defined in these four ways. However, "today, most philosophers agree that rights are social constructs, open to change." He says that this view accords well with the "liberal" stance, since, "Liberals believe that rights are social constructions, defended by force and open to change and improvement." Kangas is almost certainly correct to state that rights cannot be regarded as self-evident because, as he notes, "philosophers have been vigorously arguing about them for thousands of years." It is not difficult to find support for Kangas’ assertion that debates about rights can be messy and complex. For example, Carl Cohen, in his 1986 article, "Why Animals Have No Rights,"[5] states that "The differing targets, contents, and sources of rights, and their inevitable conflict, together weave a tangled web." Cohen’s title itself indicates philosophical controversy over recent rights claims. He has published a number of works addressing human rights concepts and the whole idea of nonhumans being right holders. Whereas theorists such as Cohen argue that nonhuman animals, as a matter of logic, cannot ever be said to bear rights, Regan and Francione disagree and have put forward differing ways by which they argue that rights formulations can and should protect sentient nonhuman interests. While Regan’s position has been described as a liberal rights perspective, Regan characterise Cohen, like Singer, as a utilitarian theorist, at least "when reasoning in support of continued widespread and possible expanded reliance on nonhuman animals in biomedical research." [2] The difference between Cohen and Singer is that Singer argues that no animal, human or nonhuman, can hold rights, while Cohen argues that all humans do and nonhumans do not. Tom Regan claims to adhere seriously to a commitment to develop an "informed, thoughtful moral outlook." According to Benton and Redfearn,[6] strength within Regan’s strategy accrues from the "benefit of latching on to the currently near-universal moral priority attached to human rights." Although it may be rather unkind of them to label Regan’s approach "a strategy," as if his commitment to human rights was only for the following reason, Benton and Redfearn acknowledge that, "Regan was the first theorist to ‘get ‘rights’ across the species barrier." Therefore, Regan can be credited with breaching that hitherto solid defensive ethical barrier based exclusively on species membership, of which the construction, maintenance, and usage of has featured prominently in some of my other blog entries. [1] Adam Kydd’s on-line review (http://www.animalaid.org.uk/) of Francione’s Introduction to Animal Rights argues thatthis book should be seen ‘as the true bible of the Animal Rights Movement’. [2] Regan, T. (2001) Defending Animal Rights. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press; Throughout Animal Liberation Singer is careful to talk about the "Animal Liberation movement" and never speaks of a clash between human and nonhuman rights, rather human and animal interests. In the 2nd edition of Animal Liberation, Singer was motivated to say something about rights formulations: "The language of rights is a convenient political shorthand. It is even more valuable in the era of thirty-second TVA news clips" (Singer, cited by Francione 1996: 49, 240). Francione, G. L. (1996) Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. [3] Francione, G.L. (1995) Animals, Property, and the Law. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. [4] www.huppi.com/ kangaroo/L-rights.htm [5] Originally printed in the New England Journal of Medicine, Vol 315(14) (October 2, 1986): 865-69, this citation is taken from wysiwyg://19/http://www.responsiblewildlife management.org/carl_cohen.htm Critics of Cohen (including Regan [fn 2] and Nathan Nobis [http://courses.ats.rochester.edu/ nobis/papers.cohen-kind.html]) have noted how rare it is for a philosophical work to feature as the lead article in a medical journal. [6] Benton and Redfearn write: "Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation is…within the utilitarian tradition, and it may be that the animal welfare movement’s concern with animal suffering is a measure of the pervasiveness of utilitarianism as the ‘common sense’ of secular morality." Benton, T. & Redfearn, S. (1996) "The Politics of Animal Rights - Where is the Left?" New Left Review, Jan/Feb: 43-58. In a discussion about forms of social knowledge, sociologists David Lee and Howard Newby claim that both common sense knowledge and ideological beliefs suffer from certain limitations (which, they say, sociological knowledge can go some way to overcome). Lee and Newby elaborate on the point, suggesting that these forms of knowledge are self-centred, incomplete and likely intolerant.
This latter suggestion is interesting, especially since they add that ideological belief can, "foster a dogmatic style of thought that insists on being right regardless." Of course, all ideologies may have these characteristics, including those based on ideas and beliefs we all favour and hold, as much as those based on beliefs we oppose or are generally "neutral" about. Constant vigilance and a commitment to critical thinking are required to ameliorate these tendencies to dogmatism. Traditional animal welfare ideology displays these dogmatic characteristics, built on society-wide opinion that animal welfarism is undoubtedly, self-evidently, almost "naturally," the right and proper way to assess the morality of what humanity does every day to other animals. Animal welfarism remains largely accepted, generally without question, as the reasonable and realistic paradigm for evaluating human-nonhuman relations. Throughout the Western world, the ideology of animal welfarism is firmly institutionalised and its central ideological tenets are widely adopted and culturally internalised. Claims are made on a regular basis, often by British farming interests and politicians of all stripes, that the "United Kingdom" has the strictest animal welfare standards in the world. Thus, it is suggested, "welfare costs" are substantial to the commercial industries which use nonhuman animals and animal welfare legislation should not readily be further strengthened without very good reason. However, there appears to be a general acceptance - or at least the articulation of a formal recognition - of the welfarist stance that says the "price" paid for maintaining "high welfare standards" is harsh and yet justifiable because, the ideology suggests, the users of nonhuman animals are concerned more than most about animal welfare. That said, the notion of going beyond what is evidently necessary to achieve "humane treatment" is clearly regarded as largely uncalled for, especially since it may dramatically endanger commercial competitiveness. In this sense, and rather like formal supportive claims towards health and safety provisions, animal welfare practices and legislation are presented as "essential," "adequate," and "strong but fair," notwithstanding that its provisions come at a cost. This is essentially the presentation of a pluralist political model allegedly based on seeking some satisfactory balance of various and often contradictory interests, even including some of the interests of the "lower animals" that humans routinely use as resources. This explains why animal rights claims are met by animal welfare statements from animal users. In practice, organisationally and politically, animal welfarism is a constituent part of the various battle grounds and compromises between and among mobilisations such as the National Farmers Union (NFU), Friends of the Earth (FOE), the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), Compassion in World Farming (CIWF), the British government’s Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) and the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA – formally the Ministry of Agriculture). This means that the "reasonable, reasoned and proper debate" over the human use of other animals is seen as rightly the province of legitimate mainstream organisations committed - on some level or other - to conventional animal welfare tenets. This means that they are committed to the "non-cruel" exploitation of other animals for human ends. Thus, "on the animals’ side" (although all participants would loudly claim this particular image-friendly status), groups such as CIWF stand for a move toward ~or a return to~ extensive systems of "animal husbandry," while the more politically powerful NFU would more likely support the status quo of substantial intensive production. The most dogmatic elements of traditional animal welfarism are readily evident when they are challenged by animal rights claims, on the one hand, and (now rare) Cartesian-inspired claims that there are no ethical issues involved in the human utilisation of other animals. Clearly, animal welfarism’s institutionalised status as the firmly-fixed orthodoxy is its greatest strength: from this assured position other perspectives can be authoritatively characterised as "extreme" and "unnecessary." The widespread social orientation to animal welfarism means that any thinking about human relations with other sentient beings is almost mechanically assessed within this long-established and entrenched paradigm. Animal welfarism, unsurprisingly, is all-pervasive, even in campaigns "for" nonhuman animals. Most animal advocacy organisations, even those describing themselves as "animal rights" mobilisations, base their claims on central welfarist concepts such as cruelty rather than on rights violations. By its own standards animal welfarism can claim to "work," or function, in the sense of reducing "unnecessary suffering" caused by the human use of nonhuman animals. This apparent functionality leads to suggestions that alternative views represent unnecessarily radical or "utopian" views. Just as common sense knowledge is regarded as enough to understand social phenomena, animal welfarism is considered as sufficient to understand the needs and requirements of nonhuman animals. In the early 1990s, political scientist Robert Garner reviewed several philosophical positions on human relations with other sentient beings and situated traditional animal welfarism in a broad centre ground position by characterising it as the "moral orthodoxy" in terms of ethical views about other animals. Garner also identified two comparative extremes to the welfarist "centre": the presently rare "no moral status" position, and the growing "challenge to the moral orthodoxy," which Garner (often mistakenly) claims is represented by philosophers such as Andrew Linzey, Mary Midgley, Stephen Clark, James Rachels, Bernard Rollins, Steven Sapontzis, Rosemary Rodd and especially Singer and Regan. In her "dismissals model" (absolute and relative), philosopher Mary Midgley underscores the centrality of animal welfarist understandings, while noting that a certain degree of "mental vertigo" results from confusion about these positions, and this was in the mid-1980s, before Gary Francione came up with the added complication of the notion of "new welfarism." While this may be true of professional philosophers, who tend to identify and appreciate the differences between welfarist and rights-based positions, it is probably more correct to state that, in general talk, animal welfarism holds centre stage to the exclusion of other views. It is also important to note in this respect that, despite regularly being labelled as concerning "animal rights," the vast majority of mass media coverage of issues concerning the treatment of nonhumans is unconditionally welfarist in content. Writing in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Aubrey Townsend attempts to further define the conventional welfarist view of other animals. He argues that the ethical orthodoxy allows a distinction between two sorts of moral considerations. The first applies to human and nonhuman animals and is based on a welfarist commitment to do what promotes the "living of a pain-free happy life." The second consideration is reserved for humans only and is based on a respect for personal autonomy - "for what an individual wants or values." Therefore, since animals are regarded as "only sentient," they can only be accorded an inferior moral status compared to human beings: Thus, we are entitled to sacrifice the interests of animals to further human interests, whereas we are not entitled to treat humans in the same way - as part of a cost-benefit analysis. Robert Garner ultimately offers animal rights supporters little comfort, declaring that the position outlined here by Townsend, "amounts to what is the conventional view about animals at least in Britain." He also agrees that this position corresponds to the perspective of many traditional animal welfare organisations. In effect, then, welfarism accords to nonhuman animals "intermediate status" - while animals may be more than inanimate "things," they are nevertheless very much less than "persons." Understanding the status of nonhuman animals in speceisist societies means appreciating the challenge that advocates of nonhuman rights face. That animal welfarism is the dominant paradigm in assessments of human-nonhuman relations is certain. This is the view a genuine animal rights movement must fundamentally oppose. |
Roger YatesDr. Roger Yates is a rights advocate and sociologist Archives
March 2023
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