I once asked contributors to an animal advocacy forum to tell me about their experiences of public understandings about nonhuman animals. One reply I received was remarkable – so, I thought I’d reproduce it here… 

Dear Roger,

Further to yesterday’s email, you might like to read the following, it is very indicative of mainstream attitudes to “food” animals...i.e. they are not animals.

Some months back I was with two colleagues from London Animal Action. We had set up a stall at Angel Islington, complete with posters and leaflets. Whenever people stopped to sign our petitions we invited them to help themselves to as many leaflets as they wanted. 

About the time when school knocked off, we had a number of schoolgirls (about 13 – 15 years) signing. One group of about 4 started talking to us, yes, they loved animals, and yes, it was cruel to put them in laboratories, circuses etc. 

They took a few leaflets, then one noticed the leaflet entitled “Eating Animals.”

“Oh, look, some people eat animals. How gross.”

“You’re vegetarian or vegan, are you?” I asked.

“No. I’m not vegetarian,” the one replied.

“Then you eat animals, too.”

“Of course I don’t. But I’m not vegetarian,” she said.

“But, if you're not a vegetarian, then that means you eat animals. Vegetarianism means not eating animals,” I persisted.

“No, I wouldn’t eat animals, that’s disgusting.”

“Then you must be a vegetarian.”

“No, I’m not. I eat meat, but I don’t eat animals.”

By this time my two friends were listening to this, quite astounded.

“Well, let’s put it this way,” I said. “Do you eat hamburgers and things?”

“Yes, of course I do. We all do. But they’re not made out of animals.” 

“What do you think that lump of mince meat is in the middle of the bun?”

“Lamb or cow, or something, I guess.”

“Right,” I said. “And what are lambs and cows? They’re animals!”

“No they’re not,” the girls chorused. “They’re not proper animals. Animals are cats and dogs and things like that.”

“No,” I said. “Animals are cows and lambs and pigs as well.”

“Oh, no,” the first one said. “You can’t count them as animals. They’re just things that taste good.” 

They went off with various leaflets, but didn't take the ones on vegetarianism / veganism. They could not acknowledge that they ate animals, real, proper animals that is.

That’s what we’re up against.


I reported the incident in the Ph.D. – see also the comment about journalist Julia Burchill that follows… 

When members of an animal advocacy email networks were requested to contribute their experiences of public attitudes to animals, a reply was received in August 1999 from a member of the local campaign group, London Animal Action. 

This correspondent recounted a time when her information stall was visited by four teenagers. During the subsequent discussion about the leaflets on offer, one of the group said she did not eat animals although she was not a vegetarian.

After an investigation of this rather confusing and contradictory statement, it transpired that she did not consider farmed animals to be "proper animals" at all; rather they were just "things," whereas the species of animals she regarded as "real animals" were those such as cats and dogs that people kept and used as companions. 

Although these views seem distinctly odd, especially articulated in this fashion, they may be more widespread than one may think. For example, writing in the Guardian (21.8.99), journalist Julie Burchill talks about herself being "mad about animals."

However, to clarify, she adds the following caveat: "When I say ‘animals’, I don’t mean the poor brutes bred for food and I don’t mean the wild animals you see on TV... No, what I mean, of course, is pets - dogs and cats, but cats in particular." 

It seems likely that the types of representations of animals discussed here could be regarded as explanatory factors of common social attitudes towards animals and human-nonhuman relations which Francione [1] has controversially described as a general "moral schizophrenia" about animal issues. 



[1] Francione, G.L. (2000) Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Both sociologist Zygmunt Bauman [1] and philosopher Tom Regan [2] note that the “the universe of moral obligations” is remarkably “non-universal.” While Bauman claims that human beings have demonstrated an apparent “need” to draw categorical divisions and boundaries between groups, Regan asserts that exercises of exclusion have created “less than ideal” moral communities. Both theorists suggest further that a great deal of human effort is expended in “guarding” carefully drawn boundaries. 

The following outlines, in a general sense, how and, to some extent, why, boundaries are socially constructed.

For advocates of animal rights, what follows may serve to inform campaigning strategies in the sense that animal advocacy challenges some of the relevance of moral boundary drawing and yet, through Bauman’s analysis, it may be seen ~ and must be appreciated ~ that boundary drawing has a great deal of utility and advantage for those who draw them. 

In other words, boundary drawing is an efficacious method of defining notions of “my group,” one of, possibly, several groups that members of society rely on for the everyday knowledge that they need to survive. 

Bauman asserts that much essential and routine social knowledge is acquired in early childhood, thus a great deal of what is assumed to be required for “successful” social living involves boundary-drawing activities that may encourage a resistance toward any subsequent claims that seek to effectively weaken or destroy boundaries of discrimination that exist even among human groups. 

All seasoned social movement and political campaigners, along with other advocates of change, will recognise much truth in Bauman’s implication that human beings are never entirely free from their past in which socialised boundary drawing has created meaningful “us” and “them” categories. 

Boundaries effectively produce “moral distance;” thus boundaries keep “them” ~ “the other” ~ at bay, serving to emphasise distance and difference, and perhaps holding “them” up to ridicule and/or “humorous” debasement. 

Often jokes and joking relations can construct and reflect the distancing of “others”: jokes can amplify the putative stupidity of “the other,” serving to dehumanise and depersonalise those placed in “them” categories, while the moral status of “us” is simultaneously elevated. A sufficiency of distance (social and moral) can apparently result in untold cruelty and utter disregard for the rights of those successfully classified as “other.” History reveals that, if a boundary of distinction is ostensibly “sturdy” enough, and especially if created and ideologically maintained by authoritative social agents, then one community can end up murdering and raping its way through another. 

“Us” and “Them.”

In Thinking Sociologically, written as an introductory text, Bauman explains in detail the societal prevalence and manufacture of “us” and “them” categories, along with the vital role of the lifelong process of socialisation; the social importance of “belonging;” the significance of notions of “community;” and the construction of “in-groups” and “out-groups.” 

In sum, Bauman provides a convincing sociological account of social learning and boundary construction which he connects to the concept of the “non-universal universe of moral obligations,” based on the putative human need to draw boundary lines and become involved in guarding those boundaries. 

As social animals Bauman notes that human beings “live in the company of other people,” in groups in which we understand that we are interdependent. To say that to live is to live with others “is obvious to the point of banality,” Bauman notes in Postmodern Ethics, yet it is just this “we hardly need to think about it” character of living with others which endows it with much of its sociological importance. For living amongst others is to live in “manifold webs of human interdependency.” 

One important “product” of this interdependency is something sociology has a special relationship with: common sense.

Bauman regards common sense knowledge and understandings as powerful social mechanisms which can fundamentally shape attitudes about the world in which humans live. The apparent “power” of common sense emerges from its general immunity to being seriously questioned with obvious implications for social movement activists who seek social and political change. It has an effective capacity for self-confirmation; its knowledge is based on precepts which are, by its own lights, largely self-evident. 

Common sense understandings are maintained, argues Bauman, through repetition of the “routine,” and the enactment of the “monotonous nature of everyday life.” This enactment of routine has two characteristics: it informs common sense while being informed by common sense. Bauman adds:

• As long as we go through the routine and habitualised motions which fill most of our daily business, we do not need much self-scrutiny and self-analysis. When repeated often enough, things tend to become familiar, and familiar things are self-explanatory; they present no problems and arouse no curiosity.
  

In a way, they remain invisible.

• As social beings, humans live in groups which can exert an immense “hold” on the individual. The group “makes people,” and this means that resisting the important messages of the group can be a relatively hard thing to do.
  

Abiding by - rather than challenging - the norms and values of your group is much the easiest and most unproblematic course to adopt: “Change would require much more effort, self-sacrifice, determination and endurance than are normally needed for living placidly and obediently in conformity with the upbringing offered by the group into which one was born”:

• The contrast between the ease of swimming with the stream and the difficulty of changing sides is the secret of that hold which my natural group has over me; it is the secret of my dependence on my group. If I look closely and try to write down an inventory of all those things I owe to the group to which I - for better or worse - belong, I’ll end up with quite a long list.
  

If one wants to witness these processes in action with regard to human-nonhuman relations, we need look no further than the case of podcaster and erstwhile Burger King customer, Erik Marcus. His broadcasts are littered with appeals to conform to the existing norms and values of a speciesist society. 

While Bauman at least implies that existing values can be negated with difficulty, Marcus pessimistically asserts that the vast majority of living north Americans will only stop eating chickens when they themselves die. Marcus thinks that animal advocates need to have something to say to these militant meat eaters – the only possible concession from these people is their adherence to the principles of animal welfarism: apparently even speciesists want to exploit “humanely.”

The problem with this assertion is that it is not well supported by empirical evidence, not even in the links Marcus provides in the belief that they support his views. For example, in a web link to a forum about a recent story about Burger King, there were plenty of voices supporting the notion that there indeed are plenty of militant meat eating speciesists ~ and yet, contrary to Marcus’ claims, many of them clearly do not care at all about animal welfare concerns. 

For example, “RVGRANDMAV” writes, “I really couldn’t care less about how the animals are treated….they are grown for our food…if you don’t like what is done to them … then don’t eat them!” Meanwhile, “Ana” states that, “Frankly, I don’t care. What livestock eats and perhaps how they live too does get to the palate - and I certainly do care for taste!… If the difference is nowhere in the plate, I really don’t care.”

“Dax” asserts in the same forum, and without any discernible commitment to animal welfarism, “I really do not care as long as the food taste good, but I understand that the better the animal is care the tender their meat. Humane stand on animal care: I think is an oxymoron. They raise animals to be eaten….base on this principle I do not care how they raise them; just how good they taste. If you choose not to eat meat please stay away from my plate!”

“Tony” says, “… As for industrial farming, we need more of it not less. I care much more about hungry people in developing nations than I do about individual chickens which don’t even have a sense of self”. Likewise, “Oahu” pondered: “Hm, I’m really concerned about the way our chickens are cared for? NO”. 

This correspondent further suggests that people, “Stop applauding them and give BK a smack. What the bigwigs more likely said is ‘Hm, I noticed our profits could be a lot higher if we catered to the growing trend of people who are opposed to animal cruelty. So, let’s make a minor move…’ So, while all of you pat BK on the back, they are patting their fuller pockets.” 

“Meredith” says, “Certainly most Americans are either not aware of how their meat is raised and slaughtered, or do not care. This suggests ignorance - not an admirable characteristic in a culture considered to be “advanced.”” “Gordon” tells us: “I love a good steak and I don’t care how they kill the cow,” while “BB” states, “I could not care less. What I’d really like to see is an on/off switch for the nanny’s who spend so much time trying to tell everyone else how to live...” 

I’m not actually sure what any animal advocate can say to such people: they will reject animal rights just as they plainly reject Marcus’ new welfarism. Rather than thinking that anyone should bend to the opinions of such speciesists ~ or even those who will graciously tolerate the odd welfare move ~ we could think ahead and plan for the future.

Advocates for change can assert veganism as the moral baseline position for animal rights supporters and they can openly claim that nonhuman animals are rightholders who have their rights violated routinely by human society. 

Radical ideas take time to be assessed and evaluated by society: it is the job of the new animal rights movement to get the public used to hearing the claim that animals other than humans are also rights bearers. What can be regarded as second-wave animal advocacy had a false start in the 1970s when utilitarian welfarist Singer beat rightists Regan and Francione to the position of movement initiator.

It is only the rights advocates who assert that nonhuman animals are rights bearers and their treatment by humans are rights violations; and it is such people who are fittingly wary of peacemeal welfarist reforms.


[1] Bauman, Z. (1988) ‘Sociology after the Holocaust’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol 14(4): 469-97; (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. Oxford: Polity; (1990) Thinking Sociologically. Oxford: Blackwell. (1992) Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies. Oxford: Polity; (1993)Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.

[2] Regan, T. (2001) Defending Animal Rights. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

[3] Davies, C. (1988) ‘Stupidity and rationality: Jokes from the iron cage’, in C. Powell G.E.C. Paton (eds.) Humour in Society: Resistance and Control. Aldershot: Arena.

It’s the economics of supply and demand - and I make the demands around here.

Pictures of Starving Children Sell Records: Starvation, Charity and Rock & Roll: Lies & Tradition,
Chumbawamba 1986.


I spoke a few years ago at a university debate organised jointly by the university’s debating society and the "style society," so they wanted the talk to be about the wearing of fur. 


Of four speakers[1], one was an ex-mink enslaver, James Redmond, who has traded in mink pelts for over 30 years. His views were not altogether shocking but quite rare, I would hope, in the 21st century. Not only was he arrogantly patriarchal in the mould of those Jim Mason speaks of in An Unnatural Order,[2] his views on non-human animals were pre-Darwinian, and indeed Kantian and Cartesian, in character.

Kant said that, “as far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals are not self-conscious, and are there merely as means to an end. That end is man.” Redmond, dressed in a large leather coat, went further and suggested that nonhumans not only were not self-conscious but were not really conscious at all. He described them as mere bundles of instincts. He said that minks have no needs because "needs" implies minds - which they lack. However, he was prepared to talk about the possibility of being "cruel" to them but it was uncertain what he meant by that. Indeed, his reductionist views of mink suggested that he may equate "cruelty" with "poor pelt quality" and seemed to imply that a poor pelt somehow indicated cruelty but that does not necessarily indicate that the animal had been harmed. 

Redmond also had what seemed to be a particularly North American attitude toward knowledge; or at least he echoed the sort of views one sees in forums from those contributing from the USA. For example, he seemed to despise "book-learning" and, responding to debate participant Alan Lee’s point that the European Union had commissioned research into the welfare of farmed minks, he said that did not count because it was “objective knowledge produced by scientists.” The only knowledge that counted for him was his own – and others who have experience in the use and exploitation of captive minks. He also differentiated between dogs and minks but only to the extent that he believed the former had the ability to "portray love," whereas the only thing minks “wanted to do” was kill. Given this, he believed it was a kindness to separate minks by caging them, ignoring the fact that that are perfectly able to separate themselves given the opportunity in free-living conditions when they define, mark, and defend territory.

Ultimately he declared himself a good Irish Catholic and believes that his God says humans can use other animals. “I’m with God,” he said. By the time he declared that God had ordained that humanity could manage (as in Richard Ryder’s be superintendents of) other animals, and said, “if it is good enough for God, then it is good enough for me,” I had my first inkling that this man was not for turning. Redmond based much of his position on the straw man argument constructed by "the fox-hunting philosopher," Roger Scruton. In the foreword of a fairly-well cited article authored in 2000 by Richard North, Fur and Freedom: In Defence of the Fur Trade, Scruton writes, “Nobody has succeeded in explaining why it is wrong to farm animals for their fur, but acceptable to farm them for their meat, or why the wearing of fur-coats is so heinous compared with the wearing of leather shoes. For some years, nevertheless, groups which claim to speak for ‘animal rights’ have been campaigning for a ban…”

There is quite a lot to unpack here. For example, by 2000, Scruton’s book, Animal Rights and Wrongs, was in its 3rd edition (originally published four years earlier). In it, he explores the work of Tom Regan, Richard Ryder and Peter Singer. As an accomplished philosopher, Scruton knows well enough what animal rightists stand for, and explores in this book the marked differences between rights-based and utilitarian positions on moral questions. Of course, it may be that he is showing in the last sentence of the quote above that he’s aware that many animal advocacy organisations claim to speak for animal rights when, in fact, they adopt non-rights-based postures or attempt an incoherent mix.

It could be that, but I think not in this instance. I believe that he is following a strategy used by the fur trade in the movement-countermovement battle of ideas which, essentially, is posited on two ideas.

1. to allege that there is any difference between fur and leather, or fur and meat eating, is absurd and reveals a fundamental dishonesty and inconsistency in animal advocacy against the wearing of furs.
2. to argue that there are no differences between leather and fur and, therefore, all animal use is wrong, is extremist and fanatical.
   

The appeal of the fur lobby is well rehearsed within the pro-use community and is based on the following formulation: first they (the animal movement) will take your fur coats, then they will take the meat off your plate, and then they will stop you from having pets. This is essentially the "no-contact" scare perpetuated by the likes of the NAIA. This pro-use strategy was fully utilised by Redmond in the debate: either there is moral inconsistency afoot, and thus the fur business is being singled out when it represents just one mode of animal use, or there be extremists among us. 

Speaking third, I cheerfully adopted the view already characterised by the fur farmer as “this crazy idea of animal rights.” I cited the views of the growing number of animal advocates, claiming no particular moral difference between leather, fur, and wool wearing, and agreed with Karl Lagerfeld that the conversation about fur would be "childish" in a meat-eating, leather-wearing, society, if that were the only conversation about human relations with other sentient beings being had.

This amounts to the false claim being made by Lagerfeld, Scruton and fur traders – that this is the only conversation being had about human-nonhuman relations – and, as such, is pure ideological nonsense. Of course, they may have in mind the activities of some prominent animal advocates who would run past 100 leather jackets to challenge someone wearing fur, or some of those who would rather be naked than wear it, but that is not animal rights – or human rights for that matter. The animal rights position is quite straightforward, and regards the wearing of leather, wool and fur as the same – rights violations. 

Not everything Redmond said was utter nonsense, of course. He had a point that requires a good answer when he demanded to know why the Irish fur industry, with its 5 or 6 "farms," was being singled out for legislation when there are thousands of other such units abroad, mainly in places like Denmark, the USA and China. Since there are at least five animal advocacy groups in Ireland pushing for a ban, this is an issue I have not been able to get to the bottom of. There is an apparent assumption that attacks on the supply side of this use industry can significantly harm it, regardless of its global reach and scope. There is also the usual seduction that any "animal issue" that enjoys public support, once identified, will or may act as a gateway for animal advocates to talk about other concerns. In this history of animal advocacy, this logic has been applied in relation to bear baiting, hunting, whaling, circuses and, indeed, the fur trade (particularly the trade in seal pelts).

In an increasing globalised culture and economy, it is not clear how piecemeal attacks on the supply side will effect the demand for animal products. We know that demand for virtually anything ~slaves, pornography, nuclear weaponry, alcohol and so on~ will stimulate supply. In 2009, the HSUS claimed that global fur sales were experiencing a drop. They cited the availability of fake fur, the economic recession, and altering public attitudes to the morality of fur wearing as important factors. According to their press release, “Gallup, Inc. conducts an annual poll of Americans assessing the public’s stance on a number of 'moral' issues, including 'buying and wearing clothing made of animal fur.' Data show an erosion in the percentage of Americans who find the practice 'morally acceptable.' The number who find it 'morally wrong' has been increasing at the same rate, showing public opinion turning against the trade.” 

The HSUS are a little shy of providing the actual numbers. I searched the Gallup web site and could access 2007 figures for US attitudes, revealing majority support for the fur trade. 52% of "liberals," 57% of "moderates," and 61% of "conservatives" found the buying a wearing of fur "morally acceptable." 

This is the challenge on the demand side. As long as there is this magnitude of demand it will be supplied by someone, somewhere in the globalised economy and whether there are 5, 10 or 0 fur "farms" in Ireland is irrelevant. Indeed, there is a question at the moment as to what extent the Irish fur farms supply the Irish fur shops. Given the traditional trade links between Ireland and Britain (where the processing of fur is not banned) and the USA, Irish fur consumers are unlikely to experience a shortage of supply. 

The truth is, if we cannot reduce demand then nonhuman skins will continue to be sold in Ireland. Essentially the demand is the demand of speciesism: the view that human beings can legitimately use and override the rights of nonhuman animals for a whole variety of purposes.



[1] Myself, James Redmond, a freelance journalist and Alan Lee, a representative of ARAN, an Irish animal protection organisation, who declared and adopted a welfarist approach to the issue, locating differences between beef production and fur production in Ireland. His welfarist case was reinforced, if anything, when he told a member of the audience that he was indeed wearing leather shoes.

[2] For example, he argued that the claims of the animal movement were deliberately shaped and distorted in order to influence young women who were overly sentimental and vulnerably emotional compared to men who were much better able to deal with the practicalities of the ‘real world.’

This blog entry is designed to further explore sociological understandings of human-nonhuman relations. Its focus, once more, is on the powerful societal role played by institutionalised animal welfarism. 

Essentially, animal welfarism serves to regulate and control the human use and systematic exploitation of other animals while rarely attempting to totally end such use and exploitation. This is certainly true of orthodox forms of animal welfarism, while post-1970s "new welfarism" (law professor Gary Francione's controversial term) insists that step-by-step reform of exploitative practices may eventually abolish use, an ideological assertion disputed by abolitionist animal rightists. 

From a sociological point of view, animal welfarism cannot be solely regarded as simply a set of legislative interventions enacted from the beginning of the nineteenth century to control, regulate and enforce the “humane use” of other animals. Orthodox animal welfarism undoubtedly seeks to perform its regulatory function: it regulates exploitation, while user industries can cope with welfare reforms if profits are not seriously dented - and yet animal welfarism appears to do far more than this. For example, it operates as a firmly entrenched institutionalised ideology that effectively helps to promote and maintain the value of “kindness to animals,” and an ethos of “caring for” or “loving” nonhuman animals, while at the same time justifying routine harmful practices and time-honoured social attitudes. 

As for user industries, it does them no real harm to be seen to respond to welfarist considerations – after all, they routinely claim the status of concerned welfarists, and they routinely reply to rights-based claims with animal welfare assurances. Typically, when animal welfare modifications are afoot, they spend a small proportion of their vast fortune initially opposing all reform attempts. Some fights they win, a few others they lose. However, aware of the transient nature of public attention, even in the latter cases, user industries can subsequently gain promotional benefits by characterising themselves as “animal welfare friendly” or “humane” - and all the better if they can secure ringing endorsements from former opponents in the national animal welfare corporations, which seem to come ever more frequently. 

The apparent transience of public attention is matched by its failure to fully focus on precise detail. This is one major reason why modern-day politics is based on short ~and oft repeated~ sound bites. Likewise, public inattention also helps to explain why Francione, talking to Vegan Freaks Radio a few years ago, that his university colleagues assumed, due to PeTA’s promotion of McDonald’s limited welfare reforms, that the whole of McDonald’s range was to be considered “humanely produced.” 


They even thought that Francione himself would be eating there. 

Sociologists who study the mass media warn that there is an important issue of the encoding and the decoding of messages and – even in the age of the internet, the mass media are still the source of most people’s knowledge of the news. In other words, while PeTA may believe they clearly highlighted the limitations of the McReforms, that in itself does little or nothing to guarantee that audiences will receive the message “as sent.” 

In general terms, animal welfarism is the accepted societal lens through which moral issues raised by the treatment of other animals are made sense of. Animal welfare opinion is so commonplace, and so firmly sedimented in the public consciousness, that regarding human-nonhuman relationships in any other way is most unusual and exceptionally difficult, even for “pro-animal organisations” and individual campaigners in the nonhuman advocacy movement. Therefore, ideological animal welfare has not only served to regulate exploitation but has also, for generation after generation, been a central support system justifying and excusing what humans have done ~and continue to do~ in the name of science, agriculture, and entertainment. 

Conventional animal welfarism - the very name implies as much - is generally seen in a positive light. It is so firmly entrenched in the modern cultural imagination that it is regarded, according to research fellow at the University of Sydney, Barbara Noske, as “an accepted good in Western society.” Furthermore, as stated, effective animal welfare legislation and “good welfare practice” has always been claimed, increasingly so in recent years, as the most serious concern - often the number one interest - of those who themselves wish to actively exploit nonhumans as a commercial or “sporting” resource. In other words, it is fairly rare to find even animal users who do not regularly articulate fervent support for the concept of orthodox forms of animal welfarism. 

Since the emergence of animal rights philosophy represents both a radical rejection of the human use of other animals and also a fundamental challenge to its regulatory mechanisms, conventional animal welfarism responds to rights-based claims ideologically. It responds with a generalised charge that rights-based approaches are “unwarranted interferences,” “extreme opinions” and, most of all, “unnecessary ideas.” New welfarism reacts in a similar but not exactly the same way. 

Thinking about rights and welfarist approaches to human-nonhuman relations means thinking about very different approaches to the subject, whereas traditional and new welfarists simply locate themselves in different places on a continuum that starts at least with regulating use. Essentially, traditional animal welfarism suggests that any desire to go beyond its own established precepts makes no sense, and serves no positive function, not even for nonhuman animals. New welfarists join in with pejorative claims about “utopianism” and “impracticality,” while having abolition as their end game. Not only does animal welfarism stand like a monolith to inform the vast majority of discussions about human-nonhuman relations, fundamental and historical social conventions, and routine practices, gives succour to mainstream, society-wide, views that firmly state that:-

(1) human beings are entirely justified by many religious and philosophical canons in their use of other animals for their own purposes and 

(2) this exploitative use, precisely because it is thought to be strictly controlled and regulated, can be properly regarded as ethically acceptable since the animals so used do not actually suffer in the course of their usage.



Fundamental social “truths” concerning human-nonhuman relationships are thought to be ~and repeatedly asserted as~ so self-evident that the norms and values which support mainstream views about other animals are unconsciously, and without controversy, transmitted on a daily basis at every level of primary, secondary and adult socialisation. 

Put simply and directly, human beings in western societies are socialised to become animal harming animal lovers. 

Since the “normal,” “justified,” and “proper” use of other animals is a central feature of western cultures, the apparent self-evident character ~and the unequivocal “correctness”~ of these embedded social attitudes means that any challenge to them can almost automatically be regarded as unneeded, beyond the pale, unreasonable, invalid, irrational and even “dangerous.” 

Claims from animal rights positions state that society is so prejudiced on the basis of species membership that, fuelled by notions of “human chauvinism,” most people quite unproblematically instil speciesist ideology into children day after day, week after week, year upon year. They do this through routine discourse and everyday social practices - most obviously, at every mealtime (although the majority of speciesist parents do not appear to go out of their way to tell their children what ~i.e., who~ they are eating). 

Similarly, speciesist sentiments are culturally transmitted in common stories told to children, and can be seen reflected beyond food choices, for example in clothing, social rituals, forms of entertainment and social gatherings. In terms of what children learn about human orientations toward other animals, the vast majority of youngsters are effectively socialised as speciesists well before they can be regarded as ethically aware individuals. In other words, most children are encouraged to participate in organised animal-harming activities (again, for example, at every mealtime) prior to developing the ability to morally evaluate what they are brought up to do with nonhuman property and animal produce. 

Furthermore, they are routinely exposed to, and enticed to believe, the justifying ideology that accompanies the human exploitation of nonhuman “resources” – yet again, well before they know for themselves what their own and others’ conduct entails for the lives (and, of course, the deaths) of other sentient beings. Indeed, in effect, adults may feel pressure to mislead their own children, or just lie to them, about the starkest realities of many human-nonhuman relationships. 

This suggests that many parents may feel the need to obscure many of the details (if they know them) of what happens to the animals their children consume, especially those animals consumed as food. After all, who really wants to know the ins and outs of what humans do to other animals when they exploit them? Ironically, an average vegan is likely to know much more about how a piece of an animal’s muscle arrived on a flesh eater’s plate than most meat eaters.

The danger of the new welfarist approach to human-nonhuman relations is that it misleads the public into thinking that caring about nonhuman animals amounts to picking and choosing between different animal production systems. Pay a little extra, and look out for our endorsements, new welfarism seems to say, and then it points the public to animal produce they should eat and to those products they should not. Surely, openly advocating veganism as the baseline position of animal rights is much better ~and even simpler~ than getting our feet wet in such muddied waters?

Number 33 in the On Human-Nonhuman Relations Podcast series explores public vegan education initiatives in the shape of VEGAN INFORMATION BOOTHS. I'm joined by my special guests for this themed podcast - Jordan Wyatt of the Invercargill Vegan Society, Barbara DeGrande of Animal Rights and Rescue of Texas, and Stacia Leyes of The Vegan Review.

We must remember that vegan education that puts veganism as the moral baseline of the animal rights movement is NEW. We may feel that we have been doing it for years and years but historically it has only just begun.

See THIS LINK to hear Ronnie Lee, vegan since 1971, explain just how new vegan campaigning is.

There are people who insist that vegans should engage in less-than-vegan campaigning. There is absolutely no reason for this. Even if we believed that initiatives such as "veggie days" or "meat reduction campaigns" are worthwhile, there are plenty of non-vegans and vegetarian organisations who can do this work.

There are more non-vegan animal advocates, and vegetarian organisations, than there are vegans. Please - if you are vegan, don't be conned into less-than-vegan campaigning. Don't let others convince you that vegan is a scare word (an idea explored in the podcast), or that we should not use it just because some people have negative views about either some vegans themselves or veganism in general.

As Donald Watson said in 1944, our "job" is to ripen up people to the idea of veganism - if there are vegan voices (say, on social media) that are rather off-putting, or you think they may be for the general public, then let's try to encourage positive change in those vegans - but not slide away from veganism. Sliding away from veganism means redefining it: resist those voices who are trying to suggest that veganism is merely a diet.

It isn't and it never has been. Please don't betray the original expansive justice-for-all scope of vegan philosophy.

Over a number of exchanges with Dr. Koichi Tagami of Rissho University, Tokyo, Japan, I have been exploring how the issue and idea of animal rights is evolving in Japan. Dr. Tagami is an expert on Marx's theory of alienation and is the author of "Practical Environmental Ethics" (2006).

I am grateful to Dr. Tagami for giving me permission to reproduce the following exchange.

Dear Dr. Tagami,

Hello and I hope you are well. As you are aware I am sure, I am interested in the philosophical evolution of the "animal rights movement". I see that in a very short period of time, you have realised and appreciated that one must turn away from Peter Singer's utilitarianism, and turn toward theorists such as Gary Francione and Tom Regan, if one wishes to gain a genuine animal rights understanding of human relations with the nonhuman world.

Given this, you have taken a journey that the "animal rights movement" refuses to take. Therefore, I would be interested to hear of your philosophical journey, so to speak, in your exploration of animal ethics. At the present time, in Europe and North America, there is a struggle going on involving animal advocates who are serious about rights and animal advocates who merely use rights rhetorically, in group names for example. I would very much appreciate your comments on this, should you wish to share them.

With very best wishes and respect,

Dr. Roger Yates.


Dear Dr. Roger Yates.

First of all, I would like to explain how I have come to accept the theory of animal rights. 

To begin with, my main research theme is 'the formation of ideas in early Marx’, and since the publication of my first article in 1991 I have been writing on issues surrounding the texts of early Marx, such as Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and the German Ideology. After collecting the results of my research in a book entitled The Theory of Alienation in Early Marx, I obtained a doctorate in 2000. 

However, this does not mean that I had no interest in, nor knowledge of, animal ethics. For I have been asked to teach ethics in university since 1994, and as a result, I have come to study issues in modern ethics, and become familiar with Peter Singer’s work. As you well know, Animal Liberation describes in detail the horrific conditions which animals suffer in factory farming, and this strongly impressed on me the strength of Singer’s argument. Yet, at the same time, I felt antagonistic towards his demand for vegetarianism. A ‘meal without meat’ seemed to me at that time unimaginably ‘abnormal’. I loved meat and was under the impression that I could not tolerate vegetarian meals. Besides, the fact that there were no vegetarians around me, and the fact that no one recommended it really worked against me.
In terms of my profession, there are many ‘academics’ who teach ethics, but there are no vegetarians, nor an ‘ethicist’ who supported animal rights (this is still the case). 

On the contrary, the common attitude among the ethicists around me was that it was ‘ridiculous’ to put animals in the same category as humans, and that Singer’s argument was ‘extreme’ and did not deserve to be taken seriously. Consequently, although I felt that Singer’s argument was quite persuasive, I pretended to ‘look away’, and decided ‘not to think about it’. Nevertheless, ever since obtaining a doctorate, I have come to research environmental ethics in earnest. While re-reading books relevant to animal rights, I was becoming more convinced than ever of the evil of meat-eating. And Singer’s message that ‘one should become a vegetarian’ had changed from an irritation like ‘something in-between one’s teeth’ to an intolerable discomfort. 

Yet the reason I still could not decide to be a vegetarian was that I believed that if I became a vegetarian, my muscles would deteriorate. I like training myself and I thought I couldn’t stand losing the results of all the exercise I had done over the years. That I used to worry about such a small thing is quite laughable now I think about it, but I didn’t know any vegetarians and couldn’t get rid of the stereotype of a ‘pale vegetarian’.

Around that time, I happened to come across an opportunity of going to India. It was December 2002. This trip to India turned out to be the biggest turning point in my life. It was literally a ‘culture shock’. One of the culture shocks I experienced was their diet. Apart from expensive restraints for tourists, diners for the Indian general public Alwasa served a set meal of dahl (a kind of soup) and vegetable curry, and even for snacks it was the rule not to use meat rather than the exception. In India ‘not eating meat’ is neither ‘abnormal’ nor ‘strange’, but rather a ‘natural’ thing to do. To witness the fact that far more people than Japan’s population are vegetarian made me feel certain that it is impossible to damage one’s health by not eating meat. After I came back to Japan, I had gradually reduced the amount of meat and animal product I consumed. And before long I became almost vegan at home, although I still consumed a tiny amount of dairy product. When I went out for a meal, if there was no way I could avoid it, I ate a small amount of animal product. Even in such cases, I chose sea food over meat. This is how my present eating habit became established. 

Eating a small amount of animal product when I go out is a compromise I have to adopt in order to survive in Japan, which is an extremely backward country when it comes to vegetarianism. Of course I don’t want to consume animal product at all, but otherwise I wouldn’t be able to go out at all. Japan really is a difficult place for the vegetarian to live in. Once I became a vegetarian, I discovered that my worry that ‘I would lose muscles’ was totally unfounded. On the contrary, my muscles came to develop more easily through training. Being able to lead a much healthier life when I am vegetarian than when I was a meat-eater has allowed me to feel that it is right to be a vegetarian. And as I lived a vegetarian life, before I knew it, the desire for meat had disappeared. By becoming a vegetarian, I felt as though the thorn with which Singer had pricked my heart had been pulled out, and this gave me a stirring feeling that I was finally released from hypocrisy. I no longer have to adopt an attitude that is unworthy of an ethicist – that is to say, an attitude of pretence that animals are excluded as the objects of moral consideration.

However, once I became a vegetarian and seriously committed to animal issues as my own problems rather than somebody else’s, I started to look at Singer’s argument differently from the way I used to. 

Although I used to think that Singer’s argument was a radical extremist one which forced people to become vegetarian, I began to think that in fact his argument is full of holes; a ‘loose’ argument. For although Singer emphasises that we should not inflict suffering on animals, he does not criticise the use of animals by humans in itself. Therefore, if animals are kept in comfortable environments and slaughtered painlessly, he will have no right to criticise factory farming. And as for animal experiment, if the ‘benefit’ humans gain outweighs the loss inflicted on animals, then, in Singer’s argument, animal experimentation is acceptable as an ‘exception’. 

Soon after I became a vegetarian and started to engage with animal issues seriously, I discovered that Singer’s argument cannot be a true rationale for the protection of animals. For, because Singer’s theory is not a ‘rights theory’ that regards animals as ‘rights-bearers’, I cannot help but think that his theory is one that accumulates ‘deferral’ which allows the use of animals, and ends up rolling down the ‘slippery slope’, and that such a theory would make the animal rights movement spineless. Thus, although Singer made me aware that we should protect animals by becoming vegetarians, once I actually became one, I began to think that in order truly to protect animals, we should not stop at Singer’s position, but proceed to genuine animal rights theories such as Tom Regan’s or Gary Francione’s. 

This is how I have become an animal rightist. Compared to the study on Marx, I have but begun to research animal rights. As a beginning I have submitted an essay [now published] entitled the Reality of Animal Rights Theories to a human rights organisation journal. The aim is to cause a stir in the present situation where Peter Singer is mistaken to be a representative of animal rights theories. Although you may find it unbelievable, in Japan there are few ethicists who subsequently declare themselves to be vegetarians and then support vegetarianism or animal rights theories. There is a gap between theory and practice. Against this tendency, I intend to deepen my research as a vegetarian animal rightist and to present my own position. 


Yours truly, 

Dr. Koichi Tagami.


We can only hope that, as Dr. Tagami continues his journey toward veganism, that it becomes as easy as it is elsewhere. It is a noteworthy and welcome development that there is someone in Japan able to explain what is - and what is not - animal rights.

Social movement historians are liable to look back at the early years of the 21st century and wonder what on earth was happening within the animal advocacy movement.

Virtually the moment that a good number of animal advocates have accepted that veganism is and should be the moral baseline of the animal rights movement, there seems to be a concerted effort to weaken, limit, and restrict the meaning of veganism. In particular, there seems to be moves afoot to reduce veganism to its dietary component only.

One of the leading organisations engaged in this reduction and redefinition of veganism is a vegetarian group called Ethical Vegetarian Alternative.

Exactly why a vegetarian group wants to impact on the vegan movement in this way is unclear - although its spokesperson does suggest that not talking much about veganism (for now - many years in fact) will speed up the adoption of veganism as a widespread social phenomenon - this means people eating 100% plant-based diets of course.

This video is a compilation of three talks by their spokesperson - all delivered at vegan animal rights events, and yet the message is dilute, moderate, and retreat.

Social constructions are powerful means by which we collectively impose social meanings. This video, although basic, illustrates the importance of social constructionism and how it is a key concept in sociology. Look out for the role suggested for social movements. And check out what the film makers say about "not seeing colour."

It is important to recognise that social constructs are powerful - but they can, and should, be challenged.

There is currently a good deal of contestation over what "veganism" means in the 21st century. It seems that much of the original vision and scope of the original vegan pioneers is being erased in favour of a more limited, business-friendly, definition.

Any thinning or blanding-out of the concept of veganism should concern modern-day ethical vegans who take an expansive view of what veganism does and could mean. This is especially true when we learn that there is at least one government-funded vegetarian organisation whose operatives speak at vegan and "animal rights" events suggesting that vegans should "tactically" eat animal products (and not be too picky about that possibility), while "strategically" limiting the vegan movement to be just about food.